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Abstract
This paper studies auctions in a setting where the di.erent bidders arrive at di.erent times
and the auction mechanism is required to make decisions about each bid as it is received. Such
settings occur in computerized auctions of computational resources as well as in other settings.
We call such auctions, on-line auctions.
We 3rst characterize exactly on-line auctions that are incentive compatible, i.e. where
rational bidders are always motivated to bid their true valuation. We then embark on a
competitive worst-case analysis of incentive compatible on-line auctions. We obtain several re-
sults, the cleanest of which is an incentive compatible on-line auction for a large number of
identical items. This auction has an optimal competitive ratio, both in terms of seller’s revenue
and in terms of the total social e6ciency obtained.
c© 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Auctions are a commonly used tool for selling goods in cases where a true compet-
itive market does not exist. In the typical case multiple buyers aim to buy some good
from a single seller, and the seller wishes to sell the good for the highest possible
price. Many types of auctions have been considered in the literature, and an elegant
theory has evolved. For an introduction see e.g. the textbook [20].
 A preliminary version appeared in the Proceedings of the Second ACM conference on Electronic Com-
merce (EC’00). Supported by grants from the Israeli Ministry of Science and the Israeli Academy of Sciences.
E-mail addresses: tron@cs.huji.ac.il (R. Lavi), noam@cs.huji.ac.il (N. Nisan).
0304-3975/$ - see front matter c© 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/S0304-3975(03)00391-8
160 R. Lavi, N. Nisan / Theoretical Computer Science 310 (2004) 159–180
In recent years auctions have found new applications in trade that is performed on
computer networks and especially over the Internet. Such applications include electronic
commerce [5,23], computational and network resource allocation [24,25,18,16,22,29,
10,31], trade between software agents [26,9,27], and more. With these new applications
new questions arise.
This paper studies auctions in a setting where the di.erent bidders arrive at di.erent
times and the auction mechanism is required to make decisions about each bid as it
is received. This is in contrast to the traditional assumption (in theory and in practice)
that the auction organizer must receive all the bids before determining the allocation.
The traditional assumption implicitly assumes that all participants (including the auc-
tioneer) are willing to wait for some amount of time (until all bids are gathered) before
performing any trade. We argue that in many settings, especially computerized ones,
players will not be willing to wait a long time for the allocation decision.
An example of such a setting is bandwidth allocation on a communication link.
Consider a 3xed communication link in some computer network. In cases where the
demand for communication over this link exceeds the link’s bandwidth, a popular ap-
proach for allocating the limited bandwidth is by auctioning it among all the possible
uses [18,10,19,14]. However, in such a setting one would expect the requests (bids) for
bandwidth to arrive at di.erent times—each request needing an immediate answer. Sim-
ilar situations arise in the allocation of other resources such as CPU time or cache space.
In our model, k identical items are sold in an auction. Each bidder has a (privately
known) valuation for each quantity of the goods, where the marginal valuations of the
bidders are non-increasing. The bidder learns this valuation at a certain time and must
make a bid at that time. The auction mechanism must decide, as the bid is received
(and before seeing future bids), how many items to allocate to this bidder and at what
price. We term such an auction on-line. (We also consider more general variants where
the valuations as well as bids may be time-dependent—all our results extend to the
general variants).
Our main concern in this paper is with the incentive compatibility—also called truth-
fulness or strategy-proofness—of the auction. An auction is called incentive compatible
if participants are rationally motivated to reveal the truth about their valuations. Specif-
ically, in game-theoretic terms, if the truth is a dominating strategy. This is a departure
from the 3eld of on-line algorithms (see [7,12]) which does not address any game-
theoretic issues but only algorithmic ones.
In his seminal paper, Vickrey [30] argued for the importance of incentive com-
patibility and 3rst analyzed the incentive compatible second price auction. The main
motivation is to free the bidders from strategic considerations. It has been argued
[26,9,27,28,17] that this is especially important in computerized settings.
Our 3rst result in this paper is a full characterization of incentive compatible on-line
auctions: We de3ne an on-line auction as “based on supply curves” if before receiving
the ith bid, bi(j) for 16j6k, it 3xes some function (supply curve) pi(j) based on
previous bids, and,
1. The quantity qi sold to bidder i is the quantity q that maximizes the sum∑q
j=1 (bi(j)− pi(j)) (i.e. the bidder’s utility).
2. The price paid by agent i is
∑qi
j=1 pi(j).
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Theorem 1. A deterministic on-line auction is incentive compatible if and only if it
is based on supply curves.
We then employ a worst case analysis of on-line auctions. This is in the spirit of
computer science and in sharp contrast to the usual Bayesian (average case) analysis
employed in auction theory (as well as in other economic situations). The overriding
reason that worst case analysis is the almost universal choice in computer science is
that it turns out that “real world” distributions in computational settings are almost
always very di.erent from any theoretical distributions assumed in an average case
analysis. In such cases an average case analysis is worthless while a worst-case analysis
does provide performance guarantees. This is not the place for a lengthy discussion
of the merits of worst case analysis compared with those of average case analysis.
The interested reader may refer e.g. to the introductory textbook [4, pp. 9–10]. We
strongly feel that as auction theory is increasingly applied to computational settings,
the importance of worst case analysis increases.
Speci3cally, we assume in this paper that bidders’ valuations all belong to some
range [p; Mp] (without assuming any probability distribution), where p is also the seller’s
reservation price, i.e. each item is worth p to him. We compare the performance of an
incentive compatible on-line auction to the performance of the standard o4-line Vickrey
auction—for one item, this is the sealed bid second price auction, or, equivalently,
the popular open cry English auction with small bid increments (all exact de3nitions
appear in the paper body). This auction is incentive compatible and obtains optimal
social e5ciency, i.e. maximizes the sum of all players’ valuations of the items they
receive.
Similarly to the de3nition used in on-line analysis of algorithms, we focus on
the, so-called, competitive ratio: An on-line auction is called c-competitive with
respect to the revenue (relative to the Vickrey auction) if for every sequence of
valuations of bidders it obtains a revenue that is at least 1=c of the revenue ob-
tained by the Vickrey auction for these valuations (where the Vickrey auction knows
all bids in advance). Similarly we de3ne c-competitive with respect to the social
e5ciency. We note the dissimilarity between the economic meaning of the term
“competitive” and its meaning in computer science, which is the one used
here.
The tightest set of results is obtained when the number k of items is large, so
it can be treated as a continuum. This can be viewed as the case of one divisible
good, i.e. it can be divided to any number of small fractions. For this case we are
able to 3nd the optimal on-line incentive compatible auction. We de3ne the com-
petitive on-line auction by using the function suggested in [8] to construct the sup-
ply curves. Extending the results of [8] for on-line continuous one way trading, we
prove the following upper and lower bounds. Let 
= Mp=p, and let the constant c
denote the solution of the equation c= ln((
 − 1)=(c − 1)). It can be shown that
c=(ln
).
Theorem 2. The competitive on-line auction is c-competitive with respect to the rev-
enue as well as with respect to the social e5ciency of the o4-line Vickrey auction.
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No other on-line auction has a better competitive ratio either with respect to the
revenue or with respect to the social e5ciency.
For the case of a smaller values of k we obtain the following results. For one




other values of k, we show a deterministic lower bound of 
1=(k+1) and a deterministic
upper bound of k · 
1=(k+1). We observe also that if randomized auctions are allowed
then a better competitive ratio can be obtained. By using the supply curves of the
previous theorem for probabilistic choices, a competitive ratio of c can be obtained
(for any number of goods), where c=(ln
) is as before. In this case, the on-line
revenue is also competitive with respect to the optimal social e5ciency.
It should be noted that the competitive ratio is obtained in the worst case; in the
average case the ratio is typically much better. As a demonstration, we also provide a
“normal” Bayesian analysis of our competitive on-line auction for the divisible good,
in the case of uniformly distributed valuations in the interval [p; Mp]. For example, for
two bidders whose valuations are uniformly distributed in [1; 2] this on-line auction
achieves expected revenue of 1:31::: as compared to 1:33:: for the Vickrey auction.
While, to the best of our knowledge, competitive worst case analysis of online
auctions was not studied before, we note that competitive analysis of auctions have
also been employed by Goldberg et al. and Fiat et al. [13,11], where they analyze the
(o.-line) unlimited supply case, and design revenue maximizing randomized auctions.
Other works have adopted the model of on-line auctions: [1,2] describe on-line auctions
for unlimited supply. Blum [3] describe on-line double auctions (where the auction
mechanism is actually a market that matches buyers to sellers).
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our model and gives a full
characterization of incentive compatible on-line auctions. In Section 3 we describe
the competitive on-line auction. Section 4 outlines an extended on-line model, and




We consider an auction of k identical indivisible goods to a set of players. We
distinguish the case of a very large k that can be treated as a continuum, viewing this
case as auctioning one divisible good.
2.1.2. Players’ valuations and utilities
Each player has some positive bene3t (valuation) from receiving some quantity
of the goods. This valuation is known only to the player himself. We denote the
marginal valuation of player i as vi(j), for 16j6k, i.e. vi(j) is the additional value
gained from the jth good. Thus, his total valuation for q goods is
∑q
j=1 vi(j). We
assume that all players have downward sloping marginal valuation functions, i.e.
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∀i; j: vi(j + 1)6vi(j). 1 When player i receives q goods and pays for them a total
payment of Pi his utility is Ui(q; Pi)=
∑q
j=1 vi(j) − Pi. We assume that each player
aims to maximize his utility.
2.1.3. The on-line game and players’ strategies
The on-line game has the following structure. Initially, the set of players is unknown
to the auctioneer, and none of the players knows his valuation. At some point in time,
ti, player i determines his valuation and must declare his bid at that time. We focus
on direct revelation mechanisms, in which the player declares his marginal valuation
function. Thus, the bid is some non-increasing function bi(·) of the form bi : [1 : : : k]→
R. Of-course, a player may be motivated to lie, declaring some bi(·) = vi(·), in order
to increase his utility. The auctioneer must answer the bid immediately, before opening
the next bid. In his answer, he determines the quantity to be sold and the total price to
be paid for it. We assume that if a player does not receive any positive quantity then
his total payment is zero. 2 The game ends when the auctioneer sells all the goods or
when the last player announces his bid.
2.1.4. Incentive compatibility
We study truthful implementations in dominant strategies, which we refer to as incen-
tive compatible mechanisms. A strategy (bid) bi(q) of player i is called dominant if for
every other bid b˜i(q) and for every sequence of past and future bids of the other play-
ers, Ui(qi; Pi)¿Ui(q˜i; P˜i), where qi; q˜i are the quantities sold to player i when declaring
bi(q); b˜i(q), respectively, and Pi; P˜i are the total payments charged for each quantity.
In other words, for every bid sequence of the other players the utility of player i is
maximized by choosing the speci3c declaration bi(q). A direct revelation mechanism
is incentive compatible if for every valuation vi(·), declaring the true valuation is a
dominant strategy. Such mechanisms are also called strategy-proof, or truthful. For a
more detailed discussion see e.g. [20].
Remark 1. This model explicitly limits the strategy space of the players, excluding
any time considerations, i.e. player i must declare his bid at time ti, and is not allowed
to return. In Section 4 we remove this limitations and show that all our results still
hold for an extended model with time considerations.
Remark 2. It is also possible to consider a partially on-line model, in which the set
of players is known in advance to the auctioneer (but the valuation sequence is still
revealed on-line). Although this approach weakens the on-line power, it is more close
to regular game theory settings.
1 This assumption is common in economics, and is assumed, e.g. in Vickrey’s original paper. Without it
the Vickrey multi-unit auction is not e6cient, and in fact 3nding an optimal allocation is NP-complete.
2 This normalization ensures both participation constraints and no budget de3cit.
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Fig. 1. An example of supply curves based auction.
2.2. Supply curves for on-line auctions
We now characterize incentive compatible on-line auctions, as auctions that are based
on supply curves. Intuitively, such auctions determine the prices for bidder i indepen-
dently of i’s bid, and then sell to i the quantity that maximizes his utility under these
prices:
Denition 1 (Supply curves). An on-line auction is called “based on supply curves” if
before receiving the i’th bid it 3xes a function (supply curve) pi(q) based on previous
bids, 3 and,
1. The quantity qi sold to bidder i is the quantity q that maximizes the sum∑q
j=1 (bi(j)− pi(j)), i.e. the bidder’s utility (ties may be broken arbitrarily).
2. The price paid by bidder i is
∑qi
j=1 pi(j).
A simpler form of supply curves, which we will use below, is when each supply
curve pi(q) is non-decreasing. For such a supply curve, the quantity qi becomes the
largest quantity q such that bi(q)¿pi(q). For this simple form, the case of a divisible
good is de3ned similarly: the supply curve pi(q) is any non-decreasing real function,
the quantity qi is determined as before, and the price becomes
∫ qi
0 pi(q) dq. If both
bi(q); pi(q) are continuous then qi is the unique solution to bi(q)=pi(q).
For example, Fig. 1 illustrates a non-decreasing supply curve p1(q) and a bid b1(q).
According to De3nition 1, the quantity received by the player equals q1, and the total
price paid is the area below the supply curve, marked by the horizontal lines. The
3 Here, the supply curves are determined deterministically. A possible extension of this de3nition, when
allowing randomization, is described in Section 3.2.
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player’s valuation of the quantity q1 is the area below b1(q), and, thus, the result-
ing utility of the player is the area between the marginal valuation and the supply
curve, marked by the vertical lines. This is the entire surplus, in economic terms.
After the sale, the auction continues to the next player, presenting some new supply
curve p2(q).
Theorem 1. A deterministic on-line auction is incentive compatible if and only if it
is based on supply curves.
Proof. We prove the two directions of the theorem by the following two lemmas.
Lemma 1. An on-line auction that is based on supply curves is incentive compatible.
Proof. The utility of player i from receiving some quantity q is Ui(q)=
∑q
j=1 (vi(j)−
pi(j)) (his valuation of the total quantity minus his total payment). Let bi(q) = vi(q)
be some bid and suppose the quantity sold for this bid is q˜i, and for the truthful bid
is qi. Then it is the case that Ui(qi)¿Ui(q˜i), since this is explicitly veri3ed in the
3rst condition of the supply curves de3nition (when the bid is truthful then the term
maximized there equals Ui(q)). Thus the claim follows.
Lemma 2. Any deterministic incentive compatible on-line auction is based on supply
curves. 4
Proof. Fix any deterministic incentive compatible on-line auction A. We 3rst argue
that the total payment of player i is determined uniquely by the quantity sold to him
(and by previous bids): Otherwise, there are two di.erent bids v(q); v˜(q) such that
the quantity sold when declaring each one of them is the same but the total price
paid is di.erent. Let P be the total price when declaring v(q) and P˜ the total price
when declaring v˜(q), and w.l.o.g suppose P¡P˜. Thus a player with valuation v˜(q) will
increase his utility by declaring v(q) since he will receive the same quantity and will
pay a lower total payment, which is a contradiction since A is incentive compatible.
Therefore, denote by Pi(q), for 16q6k, the total payment of player i when receiving
a quantity q. 5 We claim that i must be allocated the quantity qi that maximizes
Ui(q)=
∑q
j=1 vi(j) − Pi(q). Otherwise, let b(·) be some bid for which A sells the
quantity qi to i. Then, if A sells a quantity q˜i = qi for the truthful bid vi(·), player i will
increase his utility by declaring b(·) instead, which contradicts incentive compatibility.
To conclude the argument, we claim that pi(q)=Pi(q) − Pi(q − 1) (for q¿0) is
the supply curve according to De3nition 1. Indeed, since Pi(q)=Pi(0) +
∑q
j=1 pi(j),
and Pi(0)= 0, it follows from the argument above that the total quantity sold is the
4 Notice, however, that the supply curves structure may be implicit in the formal auction description.
5 Technically, if it is not possible for i to receive some quantity q, i.e. no bid of his results in selling
q units to him, then Pi(q) is unde3ned, or is equal to “in3nity”.
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the total price paid is Pi(qi)=
∑qi
j=1 pi(j).
From the above two lemmas the theorem follows.
Remark. Allowing any (non-increasing) marginal valuation functions may increase
signi3cantly the complexity of presenting the valuation function to the auctioneer. This
problem can be solved by using a modi3ed auction that, instead of receiving valuation
functions, presents the (current) supply curve to all (interested) players. In this case
each bid is simply a price–quantity coordinate on the supply curve. From the same
considerations of incentive compatibility from Lemma 1, declaring the truth (i.e. the
maximal quantity according to De3nition 1) is dominant. We note that the supply
curves we give below can be presented easily.
An interesting special form of players’ valuations is 3xed marginal valuations. In this
case, the marginal valuations are restricted to the form vi(q)= vi for all i; q. This case
is also useful since we use it for the lower bound we give below. For this case, it is
possible to characterize the supply curves more precisely (this holds for the continuous
case as well, with a similar proof).
Lemma 3. Assume that all marginal valuations are of the form vi(q)= vi. Then any
incentive compatible on-line auction is based on non-decreasing supply curves.
Proof. Fix some incentive compatible on-line auction A. According to Theorem 1, A
is based on supply curves. Consider the sale to the ith player. Denote A’s total price
function by Pi(q), and A’s allocation rule by qi(v), i.e. A sells a quantity qi(v) for a
bid v (since the marginal valuation is 3xed, each bid is simply a single value).
We 3rst argue that qi(v) is non-decreasing. Otherwise, suppose there are two bids
v˜¿v such that qi(v˜)¡qi(v). Denote qi(v)= q; qi(v˜)= q˜. Since the auction is incentive
compatible, v˜ · q˜−Pi(q˜)¿v˜ · q−Pi(q), and therefore Pi(q)−Pi(q˜)¿v˜(q− q˜)¿v(q− q˜).
Thus v · q˜− Pi(q˜)¿v · q− Pi(q) and according to the supply curves de3nition, A must
sell a quantity of q˜ for a bid value of v, in contradiction. Now de3ne
pi(q) = inf{v | qi(v)¿ q};
i.e. A sells at least q for any bid v¿pi(q). Since qi(v) is non-decreasing then pi(q) is
non-decreasing as well. We claim that A is based on pi(q). In other words, for every
bid v, if A sells a quantity q then Pi(q)=
∑q
j=1 pi(j).
To see this, we argue that for any l¿1 and q¿l such that pi(q)= · · ·=pi(q −
l + 1)¿pi(q − l), it is the case that Pi(q) − Pi(q − l)= l · pi(q) (to clarify this and
what follows, consider 3rst the simpler case where pi(·) is strictly increasing—then
l always equals 1 and the claim becomes that Pi(q) − Pi(q − 1)=pi(q)). Denote
x=(Pi(q)−Pi(q−l))=l, and suppose by contradiction that x =pi(q). If x¡pi(q) then a
bidder with marginal valuation v˜ such that x; pi(q−l)¡v˜¡pi(q) will increase his utility
by declaring pi(q) instead—he will now receive q units instead of q− l (this follows
from the de3nition of pi(·)), and will pay for each additional unit x, which is less than
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v˜, his value for this unit. In other words, his utility will change by l(v˜−x)¿0, since he
will receive additional l units, and his additional payment will be Pi(q)−Pi(q−l)= l·x.
In a similar manner, if x¿pi(q) then a bidder with marginal valuation x¿v˜¿pi(q)
will increase his utility by declaring pi(q− l) instead, since his utility will change by
l(x − v˜)¿0. 6
We can now conclude that, if i bids v and receives q, then he pays
∑q
j=1 p(j). To
see this, notice that from the above, the sum
∑q
j=1 p(j) becomes a telescopic sum
that reduces to Pi(q)− Pi(0)=Pi(q), as needed.
In general, there is no speci3c relation between the di.erent supply curves of an
auction. However, a useful structure of supply curves, which we use in Section 3
below, is when all the supply curves are derived from some global supply curve, as
follows:
Denition 2 (A global supply curve). An on-line auction is called “based on a global
supply curve p(q)” if it is based on supply curves and if pi(q)=p(q +
∑i−1
j=1 qj),
where qj is the quantity sold to the jth bidder.
In other words, the ith supply curve is a left shift of the (i − 1)st supply curve
by qi−1. Thus, the ith bidder receives the quantity according to the 3rst supply curve
p1(q) minus the quantity that was sold previously.
3. Competitive analysis
In this section we describe on-line auctions with worst-case performance guarantees,
i.e. the on-line performance for every valuation sequence is not too far from the o.-
line performance for the same sequence. We 3rst de3ne our performance measure
(revenue and social e6ciency) and the exact meaning of a performance guarantee
(competitiveness).
For the worst-case analysis, we assume that all marginal valuations are taken from
some known interval [p; Mp], without assuming any distribution on them. We assume
that p¿0, and that it is also the reservation price of the auctioneer, i.e. the auctioneer
has a value of p for any unit he did not sell. 7
Denition 3 (Revenue and social e6ciency). The revenue of an auction A for a valu-
ation sequence , denoted as RA(), is the resulting utility of the auctioneer, i.e. the
total payment he received plus his valuation of the quantity he did not sell. More
6 To be completely exact, all this holds only for q’s that can be received, i.e. q s.t. there exists v with
qi(v)= q, but those are the only q’s we need to worry about.
7 This may be his manufacturing or shipping cost (that he may save for unsold units), an option to sell
the units for a very low price, etc.
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speci3cally, let qi be the quantity sold to the i’th player in  and Pi be the total price











The social e5ciency of an auction A for a valuation sequence , denoted as EA(), is
the sum of the resulting utilities of all players, including the auctioneer. This is also














We compare the revenue and the social e6ciency obtained by on-line auctions to
those obtained by the o.-line Vickrey auction [30]:
Denition 4 (The Vickrey auction). In the Vickrey auction, each player declares his
(supposedly) marginal valuation function. The allocation chosen is the one that maxi-
mizes the social e6ciency (according to players’ declarations). The price charged from
player i for the quantity qi he receives is the worth of this additional quantity to the
other players, i.e. the additional value of the other players when dividing qi optimally
among them. Formally, denote by E−i the optimal social e6ciency when player i is
missing, and by E the actual optimal social e6ciency. Then, the price that i pays is
E−i − (E − vi(qi)).
For example, if there is only one indivisible good, this auction becomes the well
known second price auction, where the highest bidder wins and pays the second highest
o.er. This is approximately equivalent to the popular English auction, where increasing
bids are announced until no bidder wishes to make any further higher bid [30]—as the
bid increments become smaller, the price paid by the winner becomes closer to the
second highest value.
The use of the Vickrey auction as our benchmark is not only due to its popularity but
also since it is incentive compatible. Such a non-Bayesian equilibrium is required for
the worst-case analysis we desire. In any case, the Vickrey auction is always optimal
in terms of the social e6ciency. While the revenue is not necessarily optimal in a
Bayesian setting, the revenue equivalence theorem [21] states that other auctions with
equivalent outcomes extract the same revenue.
We compare our on-line auction to the Vickrey auction in the following worst-case
sense:
Denition 5 (Competitiveness). An on-line auction A is c-competitive with respect
to the revenue if for every valuation sequence , RA()¿Rvic()=c. Similarly, A is
c-competitive with respect to the social e6ciency if for every valuation sequence ,
EA()¿Evic()=c.
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3.1. A divisible good
We 3rst focus on the case of a divisible good, i.e. a good that can be divided to any
number of small fractions (we assume w.l.o.g that we have one divisible good). We
describe a global supply curve that is (log( Mp=p))-competitive with respect to both
the revenue and the social e6ciency. For this purpose we use results of [8] for on-line
continuous one way trading. 8
Let c be the unique solution to the equation:
c = ln
( Mp=p)− 1
c − 1 : (1)
It can be shown that c=(ln( Mp=p)). For example, if ( Mp=p)= 2 then c=1:28, and if
( Mp=p)= 8 then c=1:97 [8].
Denition 6 (The competitive on-line auction). De3ne the competitive supply curve
by
p(x)=p(1 + (c − 1)ecx): (2)
The competitive on-line auction has the competitive supply curve as its global supply
curve.
In order to use the results of [8], we need to derive the following two functions from




9 In our context, these functions can be interpreted as follows:
q(x) is the total quantity sold by the competitive on-line auction when the last bid
intersects the last supply curve at price x, and r(x) is the total payment charged by the
auction for such a sequence. El-Yaniv et al. [8] analyzes these functions (separately
from their context to the supply curve), and shows that:
Lemma 4 (El-Yaniv et al. [8]). The functions q(x); r(x) preserve the following condi-
tions:
1. ∀x6c · p: q(x)= 0; r(x)= 0,
2. ∀x¿c · p: r(x) + p · (1− q(x))= x=c, and
3. q( Mp)= 1,
where c is as de;ned in Eq. (1).
The paper [8] also states the minimality of the constant c in the following sense
(this lemma is implicit in [8]):
8 In this on-line model, a trader needs to convert dollars to yen. The exchange rate is unpredicted, and is
determined by an adversary. El-Yaniv et al. [8] give several algorithms to compete in such an environment.
Here, we construct a global supply curve from a speci3c function developed in [8] for the purpose of
describing the trader conversion behavior.
9 The paper [8] uses r(x)=
∫ x
0 yq
′(y) dy. It can be veri3ed that both terms are equal.
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Lemma 5 (El-Yaniv et al. [8]). For any constant c˜¡c, there is no function q˜(x) such
that
∀x∈ [p; Mp]; r˜(x) + p · (1− q˜(x))¿x=c˜;
where r˜(x)=
∫ q˜(x)
0 p˜(x) dx and p˜(x)= q˜
−1(x) is the inverse function of q˜(x).
Theorem 2. The competitive on-line auction is c-competitive with respect to the rev-
enue and the social e5ciency.
Proof. We prove the following lemmas:
Lemma 6. For any sequence of valuations , Rcola()¿Rvic()=c, where “cola” is the
competitive on-line auction and “vic” is the Vickrey auction.
Proof. Fix some valuation sequence . For a player i let qi be the quantity he received,
and denote pi =pi(qi). Let m be the last player that received a positive quantity qm.
For all i and q¿qi, bi(q)6pi. It also follows that for all i; pi6pi+1 since p(q) is
non-decreasing. Thus, every player values any additional quantity (to that he already
received), q, by no more than pm ·q. The price that the Vickrey auction determines
for the quantity q∗i it allocates to player i is the highest valuation of the other players
for the additional quantity q= q∗i divided among them. There is at least one player,
say i′, such that q∗i′¿qi′ since the Vickrey auction allocates the entire quantity. Thus
bi′(q∗i′)6bi′(qi′)6pm. Since the Vickrey auction is e6cient it follows that for all j
and q¿q∗j , bj(q)6pm (otherwise, if for some j this does not hold, then it is possible
to increase the Vickrey e6ciency by shifting some quantity from i′ to j). Thus, every
player values any quantity addition q by no more than pm · q in the Vickrey auc-
tion as well, and therefore Rvic()6
∑
i (pm · q∗i )6pm. According to condition 2 of
Lemma 4, the on-line revenue is pm=c, and the lemma follows.
Since the Vickrey auction obtains an optimal social e6ciency, we need to prove the
following:
Lemma 7. For any sequence of valuations , Ecola()¿Eopt()=c, where Eopt() is the
optimal social e5ciency for .
Proof. Fix some valuation sequence  and denote qi; pi, and m as in the previous





i.e. player i has 3xed marginal valuation up to q= qi and then as before. The on-line
allocation for this sequence does not change since b∗i (q) intersects the supply curve at
p(qi). Since bi(q)6pi6pm for all i, it follows that Eopt(∗)6pm. It is also true that
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Ecola(∗)¿Rcola(∗)=pm=c (the equality is due to condition 2 of Lemma 4). Thus,
Ecola(∗)¿Eopt(∗)=c.
Now consider moving from  to ∗ in m steps. In each step i, if bi(q)¿b∗i (q) at
some points, then bi(q) is decreased to b∗i (q). Let 
i be  after i such modi3cations.
The on-line auction allocates to i the entire quantity whose value decreased, and thus
Ecola(i) − Ecola(i+1)¿Eopt(i) − Eopt(i+1), i.e. the on-line e6ciency decrease is
greater than the o.-line decrease since it is the maximal possible. From this it follows
that Ecola()− Ecola(∗)¿Eopt()− Eopt(∗), and we get:
Ecola()¿ (Eopt()− Eopt(∗))=c + Ecola(∗)
¿ (Eopt()− Eopt(∗))=c + Eopt(∗)=c=Eopt()=c:
From the above two lemmas the theorem follows.
A natural question to ask is whether the on-line revenue is competitive with respect
to some higher revenue criteria. As it turns out, it can be shown that for the special
case of 3xed marginal valuations, the on-line revenue is c-competitive with respect to
the optimal e5ciency (i.e. with respect to the o.-line auction that extracts the total
surplus—clearly this is the best revenue we can hope for since no player will pay more
than his value). This follows basically from the following argument: Let pi denote the
y-coordinate of the intersection point of the ith bid with the supply curve (as in the
proof above). Since players have 3xed marginal valuations vi, it follows that vi =pi.
Let m be the last player that received a positive quantity. Since for all i, pi6pi+1,
it follows that vm¿vi for any other player i. Therefore, the optimal social e6ciency
is vm · 1, by allocating the entire quantity to player m. On the other hand, the online
revenue is pm=c (as shown in the proof above), which proves the claim.
In contrast, for general valuations, the on-line revenue is signi3cantly lower than the
optimal e6ciency in cases where the Vickrey revenue is signi3cantly lower than the
optimal e6ciency. For example, consider the following scenario of two players. Let p∗
be some price and q∗ be the quantity such that p∗=p(q∗)). The 3rst player has a 3xed
marginal valuation of Mp up to q∗, and the second player has a 3xed marginal valuation
of p∗. The optimal e6ciency for this scenario is q∗ · Mp+ (1− q∗) · p∗. In the on-line
auction, player 1 will receive a quantity of q∗, since this is the maximal quantity for
which his valuation is higher then the supply curve. Player 2 will receive nothing,
since the second supply curve is higher than p∗ (as the auction is based on a global
supply curve). Therefore, the on-line revenue is at most q∗ · p∗ + (1 − q∗) · p. Thus,
for example, when setting p∗=
√
p · Mp then the optimal e6ciency to on-line revenue
ratio is larger than
√
Mp=p. It is interesting to observe that, if the arrival order of the
players is reversed, then the on-line revenue increases signi3cantly to Mp=c (although
the Vickrey revenue remains the same).
If the players’ valuations are drawn independently from a known probability dis-
tribution, then the Vickrey auction with an appropriate reservation price 10 is known
10 A threshold price—no sale is performed for a lower price.
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to have optimal revenue for several special cases (e.g. when each player has unit
demand) [21]. We note that our auction can be modi3ed to be competitive with re-
spect to the Vickrey auction with reservation price by simply taking, as the supply
curve, the maximum between the original supply curve and the reservation price (at
each point).
We now show that the competitive ratio of the Competitive On-Line Auction is the
best we can expect:
Theorem 3. Any incentive compatible on-line auction must have a competitive ratio
of at least c with respect to both the revenue and the social e5ciency, where c is the
solution to Eq. (1).
Proof. We prove the claim for the special case of 3xed marginal valuations (in other
words, even if the adversary is restricted to use only 3xed marginal valuations the
claim holds). For this case we can assume w.l.o.g (according to Lemma 3) that A is
based on non-decreasing supply curves. We also assume w.l.o.g that p=1, and denote
Mp=
. Let fn be the nth root of 
, i.e. fnn =
, and cn= c=(f
2
n ).
The following lemma assumes only the more restricted partially on-line model, in
which the number of players, n, is known in advance. For this case, it lower bounds
the competitive ratio of any on-line auction by cn, thus also implying that knowing the
number n in advance may help signi3cantly only for small values of n.
Lemma 8. No on-line auction with n bidders achieves e5ciency that is better than
cn competitive with respect to the revenue of the Vickrey auction.
Proof. Assume we have a better than cn competitive auction, we will build a function
q˜(x) satisfying the condition of Lemma 5 with a constant c˜¡c, a contradiction.
Consider the behavior of the on-line auction on the sequence of bids of the n bidders:
p1 =fn; p2 =f2n ; : : : ; pn=
. Let qi be the quantity allocated to bidder i. For all x in
the range 16x6
, de3ne q˜(x) as
∑i
j=1 qj, where i is such that pi−16x¡pi (for
completeness, denote p0 = 1; pn+1 =∞). The function r˜(x) (as de3ned in Lemma 5)
is now r˜(x)=
∑i
j=1 qjpj for the same i.
11
Now, for each i, consider the sequence of bids where the 3rst i bids are p1; : : : ; pi,
but the other n− i bids are simply 1. The revenue of the Vickrey auction in this case is
pi−1 =pi=fn. The e6ciency of the on-line auction is given by r˜(pi)+(1−q˜(pi)). Since
we assumed better than cn competitiveness, we have r˜(pi) + (1− q˜(pi))¿pi=(cnfn)=
pifn=c. It follows that for every x, if we let i be such that pi−16x¡pi, then we have
r˜(x) + (1− q˜(x))= r˜(pi) + (1− q˜(pi))¿pifn=c¿(x=fn)fn=c= x=c. This is exactly the
condition of Lemma 5, completing the contradiction.
11 Since q(x) is not a one to one function there is no inverse function p−1(x), but it can be veri3ed that
the function p(x)=pi for i such that qi−1¡x6qi is the appropriate function to use for the de3nition of
r(x).
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From this lemma it follows that for every on-line auction A with n players there
is a valuations sequence  such that RA()6EA()6Rvic()=cn6Evic()=cn. Therefore
A is no less than cn-competitive with respect to both the revenue and the e6ciency.
Since cn approaches c as n grows to in3nity, the theorem follows.
3.2. A randomized auction for k indivisible goods
We now discuss the discrete case. First we show that, by using randomization, it
is possible to obtain an expected revenue and social e6ciency that are c-competitive
(where c is as before), both with respect to the optimal social e6ciency. Thus, ran-
domization enables us to improve the performance with respect to the revenue.
When allowing randomization, the de3nition of supply curves should be altered so
that each supply curve may be chosen randomly according to some distribution (an
auction that is based on such supply curves is incentive compatible in a strong sense, as
detailed below). As noted in [6], the function q(x)=p−1(x) (i.e. the inverse function
of the competitive supply curve p(x) of Eq. (2)) may be viewed as a cumulative
distribution function in the interval [p; Mp], i.e., if we choose x randomly using q(·),
we have that for any 3xed v∈ [p; Mp]; Pr(x6v)= q(v) (note that q(p)= 0, q( Mp)= 1,
and that q(·) is non-decreasing).
Denition 7. The randomized on-line auction: before receiving any bids, the auction
3rst chooses some 3xed price pon randomly by using the cumulative distribution q(·).
The supply curve is then simply p(x)=pon, i.e. the auction sells, to each player, all
the goods with value of at least pon to him, with price pon for each good (until all the
goods are sold).
This auction is incentive compatible in the following strong sense: for any result
of the randomized choice, a player will maximize his utility by declaring his true
valuation. This is because the randomized choice actually determines a supply curve
independently of his bid. We note that it is possible to consider a weaker notion of
incentive compatibility, in which a player will maximize his expected utility (with
respect to the distribution of the randomized choice) by declaring his true valuation.
The following theorem shows that this auction is c-competitive with respect to its
expected revenue and social e6ciency. That is, in some cases the on-line revenue and
e6ciency will not be within a factor of 1=c of the optimal e6ciency. But, for any
particular valuation sequence, the expected on-line revenue and e6ciency is within a
factor of 1=c of the optimal e6ciency.
Theorem 4. For any sequence of valuations , the expected revenue of the randomized
auction is at least 1=c times the optimal e5ciency, i.e. E(Ron())¿Eopt()=c.
Proof. Suppose OPT allocates the k goods to players with valuations v1; : : : ; vk (pos-
sibly several goods to the same player) such that vi¿vi+1. For convenience assume
v0 = Mp; vk+1 =p. Let pon be the actual price determined by the on-line auction. For
the speci3c i such that vi+16pon6vi, the on-line auction sells at least i goods, and
174 R. Lavi, N. Nisan / Theoretical Computer Science 310 (2004) 159–180
thus its revenue is at least i ·pon+p(k− i). Denote the density function that the auction
uses by f(x)= d[q(x)]=dx. Therefore we have:
E(Ron|vi+1 6 pon 6 vi)¿
∫ vi
vi+1
i · x · f(x)
Pr(vi+16pon 6 vi)












i · ∫ vivi+1 xf(x) dx + p(k − i)(q(vi)− q(vi+1))
]
:























where the last equality follows from the speci3c character of the function q(x), as
stated in Lemma 4, and thus the claim follows.
3.3. A deterministic auction for k indivisible goods
We next examine the deterministic case. First consider the case of k =1. It follows
from Theorem 1 that for this case the on-line auction must 3x some reservation price
pi for the ith player, i.e. the good is sold to the ith player for price pi if vi(1)¿pi.
This is similar to the search algorithm of [6], where it is shown that a reservation price
of
√
Mp · p is √
-competitive. It is not hard to verify that this is optimal.
The general case for any k¿1 may be handled similarly:
Denition 8 (The discrete on-line auction). The discrete on-line auction is based on
the following global supply curve:
p(j) = p · 
j=(k+1); for j = 1; : : : ; k: (3)
The following theorems state the competitiveness of this auction, and give a lower
bound for this case. We give the proofs in the appendix.
Theorem 5. The discrete on-line auction is k ·
1=(k+1)-competitive with respect to the
revenue and to the social e5ciency. When k¿2 · ln
 then the discrete on-line auction
is also 2 · e · (ln(
) + 1)-competitive with respect to the revenue and to the social
e5ciency.
R. Lavi, N. Nisan / Theoretical Computer Science 310 (2004) 159–180 175
Theorem 6. Any incentive compatible on-line auction of k goods has a competitive
ratio of at least m= max{
1=(k+1); c} with respect to the revenue and to the e5ciency,
where c is as de;ned in Eq. (1).
Remark. When considering a partially on-line model, in which the number of players,
n, is known in advance, this lower bound weakens, becoming dependent in n. For
example, consider the following auction of one good to two players: The price for the
3rst bidder is p · 
2=3, while the price for the second bidder is p · 
1=3. It is easy to
verify that this is 
1=3-competitive with respect to the revenue. As can be seen from
the lower bound proof, as long as n¡k + 2 then a similar improvement (with respect
to the revenue) is possible.
4. Model extensions
We now discuss some natural extensions to our on-line model, incorporating the
following time considerations:
1. Delayed bidding: Player i learns his valuation at time ti, and his strategy space
allows placing his bid at any time t¿ti.
2. Split bidding: Player i’s strategy space allows placing several bids at any time
ti1 ; : : : ; til¿ti.
3. The Players’ valuations may be time-dependent (in a non-increasing way). Speci3-
cally, player i’s valuation is given by vi(q; t), where vi(·) is non-increasing both in
q and in t. vi(q; t) is player i’s marginal valuation of the qth good at time t.
A truthful bid is still considered as bidding the true valuation exactly once, at time ti.
We note that even under any of these extensions, when the supply curves are non-
decreasing over time there is no possible gain for a player from delaying his bid.
Clearly, a non-decreasing global supply curve holds this property. Thus we conclude:
Theorem 7. Any on-line auction that is based on a non-decreasing global supply curve
is incentive compatible even in any of these extensions.
Thus all our auctions remain truthful. Their competitiveness also remains, since the
o.-line Vickrey allocation is not a.ected by the on-line assumptions. The lower bounds
we have shown still obviously remain true. In fact it turns out that they even generalize
to partially on-line auctions (where the number of players is known in advance).
5. Revenue analysis for the uniform distribution
We compare the expected revenue of the competitive on-line auction to the expected
revenue of the Vickrey o.-line auction for a divisible good in the special case of
3xed marginal valuations uniformly distributed in [p; Mp]. This is a simple example that
demonstrates that the on-line revenue is similar to the Vickrey revenue in some cases.
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Table 1
On-line and Vickrey revenue in the average case
On-line revenue Vickrey revenue
Mp=1:5; n=2 1.15 1.17
Mp=3; n=2 1.60 1.67
Mp=10; n=2 3.33 4.00
Mp=2; n=2 1.31 1.33
Mp=2; n=3 1.37 1.50
Mp=2; n=100 1.56 1.98
Table 1 compares the revenue of the on-line auction to the revenue of the Vickrey
auction for several values of n and Mp, where p=1. The computation details are given
in the appendix. From the table, we see that for small values of n and Mp the on-line
revenue is close to the Vickrey revenue. When n increases, the Vickrey to on-line
revenue ratio approaches c, the competitive ratio.
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Appendix A.
A.1. Proof of Theorem 5
Theorem 5. The discrete on-line auction is k ·
1=(k+1)-competitive with respect to the
revenue and to the social e5ciency. When k¿2 · ln
 then the discrete on-line auction
is also 2 · e · (ln(
) + 1)-competitive with respect to the revenue and to the social
e5ciency.
Proof. Fix some scenario and suppose that the on-line auction sold q goods. We 3rst
prove the claim with respect to the revenue. Since the on-line auction sold q goods,
the valuation of one additional good of any player is at most p(q+1)=p ·
(q+1)=(k+1).
Therefore the Vickrey auction may charge a unit price of at most p(q + 1), thus the
Vickrey to on-line revenue ratio is at most:
k · p(q+ 1)∑q
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j=(k+1) + (k − q− 1)
(since k−q¿1+ k−q−1










= k · 
1=(k+1). For the second part of the claim, let l∗=(k + 1)= ln
 − 1. If ln
¡1
then 2 ·e ·(ln(
)+1)¿e¿
 and the claim is trivial since any auction is 
-competitive.
Otherwise ln
¿1, and 16l∗6k since k¿2 · ln




j=(k+1) ¿ l∗ · 
(k+1−l∗)=(k+1):
Clearly this is true for any integer l. Let the right-hand function be f(l). It receives
its maximum for l∗ + 1 and it is increasing in [l∗; l∗ + 1]. Thus for some integer























−1=(k+1) 6 2 · e · ln
;




This proves the claim for the revenue. Now consider the e6ciency case. Given a
valuation sequence =(bi(q)), consider a new sequence ∗=(b∗i (q)) built in a similar
manner to that of Lemma 7, i.e. player i has 3xed marginal valuation up to q= qi and
then as before. By similar arguments to those of Lemma 7, the o.-line to on-line e6-
ciency ratio of the new sequence is an upper bound to the ratio of the original sequence
(since the o.-line e6ciency decrease is no more than the on-line decrease). Addition-
ally, the on-line allocation for the two scenarios is identical. Let
∑
i qi = q6k. Since
b∗i (q)6p(q+ 1) then Eopt(
∗)6k · p(q+ 1). Clearly Eon(∗)¿Ron(∗)¿
∑q
j=1 p(j),




k · p(q+ 1)∑q
j=1 p(j)
6 2 · e · ln
;
where the last inequality was shown above for the revenue claim.
A.2. Proof of Theorem 6
Theorem 6. Any incentive compatible on-line auction of k goods has a competitive
ratio of at least m= max{
1=(k+1); c} with respect to the revenue and to the e5ciency,
where c is as de;ned in Eq. (1).
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Proof. We prove the claim for the special case of 3xed marginal valuations and as-
sume, according to Lemma 3, that A is based on non-decreasing supply curves. We
prove each lower bound separately:
Lemma 9. Any incentive compatible on-line auction of k goods has a competitive
ratio of at least 
1=(k+1) with respect to the revenue and to the e5ciency.
Proof. Fix some incentive compatible on-line auction A. Consider the behavior of A




2=(k+1); : : : ; 
; 
 (i.e. 2(k + 1)
players). Let q be the 3rst i such that both players with valuation 
i=(k+1) does not
receive any positive quantity (there is such q since there are k goods and k + 1 pairs
of players). Denote by  the above sequence with only the 3rst 2(q + 1) players.
Vickrey’s revenue is k · 




1=(k+1)), and the claim follows.
Lemma 10. Any incentive compatible on-line auction has a competitive ratio of at
least c with respect to the revenue and to the e5ciency.
Proof. The claim follows from the fact that for the special case of 3xed marginal
valuations the result of the Vickrey auction for the indivisible case is the same as for
the divisible case (i.e. a single player receives all the good(s) and pays the second
price). Thus, if there was an on-line auction for k indivisible goods with a competitive
ratio c˜¡c it can be used for the divisible case (i.e. allocating quantity multiples of
1=k), achieving the same competitive ratio c˜. This is in contradiction to Theorem 3,
since the lower bound there holds for the special case of 3xed marginal valuations.
A.3. The expected revenue analysis
We consider the special case of 3xed marginal valuations uniformly distributed
in [a; b] (for a¿0). Let f(x)= 1=(b − a); F(x)= (x − a)=(b − a) be the distribution
function and the cumulative distribution function, respectively, and assume that the
players’ utilities are independent. For this case, the revenue of the on-line auction is
determined by the maximal marginal utility. Its distribution function for n players
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E(Ron) =
∫ ca






























The # addition is relatively small, e.g. for a=1; b=2; n=2 it is lower than 0.006.













(x − a)n−2x dx − 1
b− a
∫
(x − a)n−1x dx
)
;
which is solved in a similar manner to the previous integral, thus the expected revenue
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